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REMARKS OF SEC COMMISSIONER
ROEL C. CAMPOSt
INTRODUCTION

I would like to thank Dean Gerald Korngold and George Dent for
inviting me to this symposium. As an SEC Commissioner, appointed
by the President in 2002, I came to the table with experiences that
would allow me to have a balanced approach to regulation and enforcement. During my career, I have been a federal prosecutor, a
corporate transactional attorney, an in-house general counsel, and an
entrepreneur and business owner. In other words, I have lived on
both sides of the regulatory table.
In this paper, I will give you my views on some of the more important corporate governance reforms resulting from Sarbanes-Oxley and
changes in self-regulating organization (SRO) listing standards, with
a focus on the need for independent boards and highly independent
audit committees. I will also speak frankly about director liability
and responsibility in today's corporate and regulatory environment.
Finally, I will give you my view on shareholder access and end with a
note on business and legal ethics.
I. SARBANES-OXLEY
As you know, the Commission has been extremely busy, as we
have recently wrapped up implementing a number of the mandates of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.' The Act was passed on the heels of
the series of recent corporate failures including Enron, Andersen,
WorldCom, and Tyco, just to mention a few, but also evident in the
older cases of Waste Management, Sunbeam, and others. SarbanesOxley is a landmark piece of legislation that was the first comprehent Commissioner, United States Security and Exchange Comission (2002-present). J.D.
Harvard Law School; M.B.A., University of California, Los Angeles; B.S., United States Air
Force Academy. These remarks constitute the views of the author and are not necessarily the
views of other S.E.C. Commissioners, the S.E.C., or its staff.
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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sive overhaul of the U.S. federal securities laws since the laws were
first adopted in 1933 and 1934. The legislation is particularly remarkable because it addresses virtually every participant in the capital
markets, including independent auditors, public companies' officers,
and boards of directors, audit committees, attorneys, broker-dealers,
credit rating agencies, and investment advisers.
It creates a new era of accountability in that the law is designed to
ensure that all participants in the capital markets are held accountable
and ultimately act in the best interests of shareholders.
II. TODAY'S Focus
My focus today will be on issues for the corporate board and management, with a particular focus on issues the audit committee should
be thinking about. I would like to start by discussing a few issues
relating to Sarbanes-Oxley as well as the somewhat recent listing
requirements that are now in place at the NYSE and NASDAQ. I do
not need to tell this audience how the environment has dramatically
changed since the bursting of the bubble of early 2000 and the corporate scandals that ultimately emerged. Certainly, from my perspective
as an SEC Commissioner, it seems like there has been no letting up
with respect to the amount of wrongdoing in our securities markets.
Yet, I am an optimist, and I believe that recent legislative, regulatory,
and SRO reforms have helped, and will continue to help, our securities markets maintain investor confidence.
I know that you appreciate the importance of investor confidence
in the securities markets, which, of course, includes trust in financial
statements of public issuers. In my view, financial statements and
other financial information are among the key sources of marketmoving information. Stock prices may go up or down the instant that
a press release containing quarterly or annual earnings information is
issued. It is the importance and integrity of this financial information
that Sarbanes-Oxley seeks to address through different means, among
other things, through:
"

strengthening board and, specifically, audit committee
independence;

"

auditor independence;

*

stiffer penalties for fraudulent disclosure;

*

more disclosure with respect to non-GAAP financial
measures and off-balance sheet transactions; and,
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of course, the establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).

In addition to Sarbanes-Oxley, there have been significant developments at the NYSE and NASDAQ where listing standards have
been strengthened through additional corporate governance requirements. These requirements, which I will discuss in more detail later,
nicely complement those of Sarbanes-Oxley.
A. Audit Committees
In speaking about independence, I want to focus first on audit
committees. It goes without saying that there is an increased focus on
audit committees and their roles in overseeing financial statements.
Dating back as far as the early 1940s, the Commission has recognized
the importance of audit committees and has sought to encourage effective and independent audit committees.
In this regard, Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley required the Commission to engage in rulemaking with respect to the independence of
audit committees. In response, the Commission promulgated Rule
10A-3, which imposes, among other things, requirements on audit
committee members that are in addition to the NYSE and NASDAQ
listing requirements. Specifically, audit committee members: (1)
cannot directly or indirectly accept any consulting, advisory, or other
compensatory fees from the company or any subsidiary except for
directors' fees and fixed compensation under a retirement plan (for
prior service) and (2) cannot be "affiliated persons" of the company
or any of its subsidiaries.
In my opinion, these stringent independence requirements were
much needed. While there are certainly other problems that independence cannot fix, having strong and independent oversight by the
board to keep management "in check" is a necessary framework. In
fact, the 1998 Blue Ribbon Committee report, which was issued by a
committee that was sponsored by the NYSE and NASDAQ, pointed
to "recent studies" that showed a correlation between audit committee
independence and a higher degree of active oversight and lower instances of financial statement fraud.
In addition to the independence requirements, Rule 10A-3 also requires the audit committee to directly appoint, retain, compensate,
evaluate, and terminate the independent auditors; pre-approve nonaudit services; resolve disagreements between management and the
auditors; and oversee the auditors. There must also be the establishment of a procedure for handling employee complaints with respect to
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accounting, internal control, or auditing matters. The function of the
audit committee, as one of many gatekeepers, is evident from Section
301's emphasis on these responsibilities.
B. NYSE/NASDAQ Listing Standards
I would like to talk next about the SRO listing standard amendments that were approved by the Commission last year. In addition to
Sarbanes-Oxley and the related Commission rulemaking, I believe
that the NYSE and NASDAQ corporate governance reforms are vitally important. Following the emergence of the corporate scandals,
but before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, then-Chairman Harvey Pitt
requested that the NYSE and NASDAQ review their corporate governance and listing standards. In response, the NYSE and NASDAQ
revised their listing standards. While there are a few differences between the NYSE and NASDAQ rules, these new listing standards
impose more rigorous requirements on listed companies through the
advancement of corporate governance.
Among the most significant of the new items is the requirement to
have a majority of the board of directors comprised of independent
directors with affirmative determinations by the board as to the lack
of any direct or indirect material relationship between the company
and the particular director. There are per se circumstances where
directors are not "independent" such as a director who is an employee
(or whose immediate family member is an executive officer) of the
company until three years after the termination of such an employment relationship. Another bright-line situation where a director is
not independent relates to a director (or an immediate family member) who receives greater than $100,000 per year in direct compensation from the listed company. Such a director would not be considered independent until three years after he or she ceases receiving
more than $100,000 per year in such compensation.
In addition, NYSE and NASDAQ companies must have audit,
compensation, and nominating/corporate governance committees, all
of which must generally be comprised of independent directors. Each
board committee must have a charter setting forth the committee's
specific purposes, goals, and responsibilities and must conduct an
annual performance evaluation of the committee. It is worth noting
that, due to the importance placed on the integrity of financial statements, audit committees are specifically held to a higher standard
with respect to independence vis-,i-vis Section 301's requirements as
compared to any other board committees, such as the compensation
and nominating committees.
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C. SOX Section 404 and the Relationship with the PCAOB
As I am sure many of you are aware (and financial executives and
corporate counselors are undoubtedly painfully aware), Section
404(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley, and the Commission's related implementing rules, now require management of an issuer to assess the effectiveness of the company's internal control over financial reporting, as
of the end of the company's most recent fiscal year. The Act also
requires management to include in the company's annual report to
shareholders management's conclusion, as a result of that assessment,
as to whether the company's internal control is effective.
The auditor's attestation on management's assessment of the effectiveness of the company's internal control over financial reporting
will be similar to an audit of financial statements. Internal controls
are management's immediate responsibility. Management designs
and operates the system of controls, including their processes for assessing the effectiveness of internal control. Once management concludes and asserts that the internal control system is effective or ineffective, the auditor attests to the probity of management's conclusion.
Section 404(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley requires the auditor to provide this
attestation pursuant to Rules established by the PCAOB.
The Commission recently approved the PCAOB standards. The
Commission heard from some in the issuer community that an extension was needed. In response, the Commission extended the Section
404 compliance date for "accelerated filers" to the first fiscal year
ending on or after November 15, 2004 and for non-accelerated filers
to the first fiscal year ending on or after July 15, 2005.
These changes have led to much complaining about implementation costs. There is no doubt that Section 404 and the related rules
have significant costs. I believe, however, that the benefits far outweigh these costs. In establishing internal control systems that meet
these requirements, companies may discover inefficiencies that have
existed for lengthy periods of time that, when corrected or improved,
actually result in operational cost savings. More rigorous emphasis
on internal controls may prevent the much-too-often scenario of
"bad" financial statements that are the result of inadequate internal
controls. Indeed, I believe that there is an added benefit of lower
costs of capital when there is sufficient trust in the integrity of financial statements. A more rigorous internal control framework helps
provide that.
Finally, the upfront costs in establishing this type of framework is
without a doubt significant; however, there will most certainly be a
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leveling off at some point after these initial expenditures, with costs
hopefully becoming much less significant.
At the same time, I believe that valid concerns regarding the attestation rules expressed through comment letters to the PCAOB have
generally been addressed in the final standard. As in most, if not all,
rules, there is a careful balancing that must be done, and the Section
404(b) area is no exception. I welcome your additional commentary
in this important area. One question that has been asked recently is
what happens when companies do acquisitions late in the fiscal year.
It is something that our staff is looking into. The Commission, in my
view, does not want to interfere with acquisitions (e.g., imposing an
assessment requirement for the target's internal controls may discourage acquisitions from occurring, at least acquisitions late into a fiscal
year). Rest assured, we are considering this important issue.
With respect to auditing standards, Sarbanes-Oxley was revolutionary in that it created a new entity, the PCAOB, to set auditing and
related professional practice standards for auditors of public companies. The PCAOB also is charged with conducting inspections of
registered public accounting firms and also has the ability to bring
enforcement actions. In the rulemaking area, the PCAOB is not technically subject to the Administrative Procedure Act; however, it has
chosen to engage in a similar type of procedure whereby it solicits
public comment to allow for interested parties to make their views
known.
Pursuant to the Act, the Commission has direct oversight and approval authority over the PCAOB. This includes the need for Commission approval of PCAOB rulemaking and its budget. In addition,
the Commission has the power to review and resolve disputes between the PCAOB and public accounting firms. There is currently,
and I firmly believe should continue to be in the future, a constant
dialogue between the PCAOB and the Commission, including on the
staff level. Coordination between the Commission and the PCAOB is
vitally important, as there are most certainly overlapping issues.
While that coordination was essentially a necessity in the Section 404
context, the rulemaking in that area is a great example of that coordination. Moreover, as both have the authority to bring enforcement
actions, there should be consideration of using both of our resources
efficiently.
D. FinancialExpert
An additional component of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that may directly impact corporate governance is the new requirement that com-
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panies disclose if they have a financial expert on their audit committees. It is not an enormous stretch to say that audit committees need
to have the ability to truly understand and dig into the company's
numbers. Someone on the audit committee should have enough familiarity in preparing or working with financial statements to be able
to probe the financials prepared by management.
What does this mean for executives? First, executives may well,
and should, get more attention from the audit committee. The audit
committee should be asking the tough questions and digging into the
financial statements. That is their job and, if executives are doing
theirs, that shouldn't be intimidating. Another possible consequence
of the new requirement is that financial executives may become stellar candidates for seats on audit committees. While you will not be
able to sit on the audit committee of a company that you work for
(because of our new audit committee independence requirements),
you might be very well suited to sitting on other companies' audit
committees due to your financial expertise.
I have heard the complaint many times that our new requirement
that audit committees consist solely of independent directors will
make it very difficult to find qualified persons to serve on companies'
audit committees. Similarly, I have heard complaints that companies
will have difficulty finding financial experts to sit on their audit
committees. Whenever I hear this, I say "hogwash." There are many
excellent, qualified candidates who are ready, willing, and able to
serve on listed companies' audit committees. Public companies need
to stop confining the search to the same old places. Companies need
to expand their horizons beyond the traditional small circle around the
CEO. I imagine that some of you in this room would be excellent
audit committee members. If you would not have been considered in
the past, perhaps you will be considered now.
Whether you ultimately sit on listed companies' audit committees,
serve as a CFO or in another corporate financial capacity, or serve as
legal counsel to the board or one of its committees, the message you
can derive from Sarbanes-Oxley is that you must be responsible and
you will be held accountable. Clearly, independent directors and audit committees must be awake, aware, well prepared, and vigilant;
CFOs, controllers and treasurers similarly will also be held accountable to the audit committee and ultimately to the shareholders; and
corporate counselors must be at the top of their game.
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E. DirectorLiability
I would like to focus on Director liability for a moment. Boards of
Directors have maintained an unhealthy distance from business decisions of their public companies. Boards, and particularly outside directors, were conceived of as the shareholders' representative; yet, too
often, they are dominated by associates and friends of senior management. Moreover, board membership too frequently has been
viewed by outsiders as an honor or a perk instead of a substantive job.
Many outside directors have lacked expertise in the relevant industry
and in accounting and financial reporting issues. Thus, Boards were
too rarely equipped to uncover and derail the determined efforts of
management to cook a company's books.
In addition, directors too often took the approach of keeping themselves distanced from things they "did not want to be aware of." This
approach is not acceptable. Directors must ask the tough questions
and get involved. And most importantly, when something that should
raise an eyebrow comes to the attention of a director, that director
must follow up and investigate. The director cannot ignore red flags,
or even pink ones.
I would like to discuss some recent actions against directors to
help you understand my state of mind here.
In SEC v.
O'Shaughnessy2 the Commission charged the Chairman of the Candie's shoe company's board and two other directors with securities
fraud for participating in and/or ignoring red flags while the company
was engaged in fraudulent accounting practices. The Commission
alleged that Candies' senior management employed three fraudulent
accounting practices to hit the estimated earnings target:
0

"bill and hold" transactions;

0

illusory sales transactions with a barter company controlled by a company officer;

*

unsupported journal entries recognize millions in "sales
credits."

What did the directors do? Our action alleged that the Chairman
of the company ignored red flags evidenced by the following conduct.
Evidence showed that an accounting officer made him aware that the
company was engaged in "bill and hold" transactions that may not be
2

Litigation Release No. 18120, Civil Action No. 03 CV 3022, 2003 SEC LEXIS 1041

(April 30, 2003).
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in accordance with GAAP. He did not investigate. He did not follow
up. He authorized the issuance of a press release that preannounced
fiscal year earnings after he had reason to know that some of the
revenue may be a result of the "bill and hold" transactions without
investigating whether Candies' projected income and revenue figures
were accurate. He also authorized an earnings release notwithstanding knowledge that the company's auditors had not yet signed off on
Candie's financial statements because of a variety of questions they
had about the barter transactions and sales credits. The Chairman had
essentially emphasized hitting earnings targets and then took the approach of "not wanting to know how it was done," and in fact ignoring facts brought to his attention that should have caused him to investigate the accounting practices. The Commission alleged that this
was reckless. He was hit with a fraud cease and desist order and penalty.
The Commission alleged that the other directors had actual knowledge of and encouraged the use of improper transactions and encouraged false confirmations to be provided to auditors regarding the
shipment of goods to cover up improper transactions. These directors
were hit with fraud injunctions, penalties, and officer and director
bars. These guys are in their forties and their careers are over.
Just a few weeks ago, the Commission filed an enforcement action
against Bristol-Myers Squibb Company.3 The complaint alleges that
Bristol-Myers engaged in a fraudulent scheme to inflate its sales and
earnings in order to create the false appearance that the company had
met or exceeded its internal sales and earnings targets and Wall Street
analysts' earnings estimates. To "beat the numbers" Bristol-Myers
perpetrated a fraudulent earnings management scheme by, among
other things, selling excessive amounts of pharmaceutical products to
its wholesalers ahead of demand, improperly recognizing revenue
from $1.5 billion of such sales to its two largest wholesalers, and using "cookie jar" reserves to meet its internal sales and earnings targets
and analysts' earnings estimates. In settling the Commission's action,
Bristol-Myers agreed to an order finding securities fraud and requiring the company to pay $150 million and perform numerous remedial
undertakings, including the appointment of an independent adviser to
review and monitor its accounting practices, financial reporting, and
internal controls.

3 See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company Agrees
to Pay $150 Million to Settle fraud Charges(Aug. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-105.htm.
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Specifically, the complaint alleged that Bristol-Myers inflated its
results by:
*

stuffing its distribution channels with excess inventory
near the end of every quarter in amounts sufficient to
meet its targets by making pharmaceutical sales to its
wholesalers ahead of demand; and

"

improperly recognizing $1.5 billion in revenue from such
pharmaceutical sales to its two biggest wholesalers. In
connection with the $1.5 billion in revenue, BristolMyers covered these wholesalers' carrying costs and
guaranteed them a return on investment until they sold
the products. When Bristol-Myers recognized the $1.5
billion in revenue upon shipment, it did so contrary to
GAAP.

*

When Bristol-Myers' results still fell short of Wall
Street's earnings estimates, the company tapped improperly created divestiture reserves and reversed portions of
those reserves into income to further inflate its earnings.

*

In addition, as a result of its channel-stuffing, BristolMyers materially understated its accruals for rebates due
to Medicaid and certain of its prime vendors, customers
of its wholesalers that purchased large quantities of
pharmaceutical products from those wholesalers.

The Commission obtained the following relief against BristolMyers:
"

a permanent injunction against future violations of the
antifraud, reporting, books and records and internal controls provisions of the federal securities laws;

*

disgorgement;

*

a civil penalty of $100 million;

*

an additional $50 million payment into a fund for the
benefit of shareholders; and

*

various remedial undertakings, including the appointment
of an independent adviser to review, assess, and monitor
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Bristol-Myers' accounting practices, financial reporting,
and disclosure processes and internal control systems.
Bristol-Myers' earnings management scheme distorted the true
performance of the company and its medicines business on a massive
scale and caused significant harm to the company's shareholders.
The company's conduct warrants a stiff civil sanction. As our investigation continues, we will be focusing on, among other things, every
individual responsible for the company's failures.
When I learn of these situations, I ask myself: "Where was the audit committee during the two years this was going on?"
F. It's Time ForAudit Committees To Go on Offense!
Audit committees and independent directors must take more affirmative roles in rooting out accounting and internal control issues.
Audit committees must engage in a fundamental business
concept--"Systematic Risk Management." I am certainly not the first
person to suggest this. The authors of countless business school textbooks and pamphlets handed out at financial executive retreats have
covered the concept, but audit committees need to take the concept
seriously.
There are five steps to implementing systematic risk management:
1) Identify potential risks;
2) Evaluate the risks and prioritize concerns;
3) Create and implement an action plan;
4) Train employees;
5) Evaluate the plan and improve on it when necessary.
These are simple concepts that anyone trained in business, particularly audit committees, should already be doing. Audit committees
should implement such a system to find early warnings of accounting
and internal control issues in their companies. Football legend Vince
Lombardi preached: "The best defense is a good offense." A
Lombardi-run audit committee would proactively seek out potential
risks.
In identifying risks and prioritizing concerns, with the framework
of 404 in mind, I believe it would be prudent for independent directors, and particularly audit committee members, to become knowledgeable about accounting shenanigans that have become pervasive
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in their company's industry, as highlighted through SEC enforcement
actions.
For example, in the software technology industry, accounting
problems have been pervasive where revenues are prematurely and
improperly recognized for long-term services tied to sales, in violation of SOP 97-2. 4 In the Internet advertising industry and telecom
industry, illegal "round-tripping" has been a pervasive accounting
problem.5
In many industries, including the biotech and software technology
industries, channel stuffing has become the illegal accounting trick of
choice to help "meet the numbers." 6
In creating and implementing an action plan, as audit committees
are working with their outside accountants in their review of internal
controls, it would be prudent for the audit committee to fully comprehend accounting issues that have become prevalent in their industry,
and requisition "spot checks" by their auditor in the course of the
financial and 404 audits to take a hard look and satisfy themselves
that no transaction accounting shows signs of channel stuffing, roundtripping, or other accounting shenanigans pervasive in their industry.
G. Reaction to a Recent Article in Director's Monthly Entitled: 7The
Heat Is Still On: Director Liability Warnings from Delaware
This article has an undertone addressing the concern of board
members that Sarbanes-Oxley and the new NYSE rules have eroded
the "business judgment rule." The general concern is that this will
make it very difficult for companies to take calculated business risks
that will advance the bottom line. I would like to put this in context
for you and highlight some important points.
Courts, in looking at the "business judgment rule," have long held
that "in making business decisions, directors must consider all material information reasonably available" and must "act in good faith."
Some have questioned whether a "new set of expectations on direc4 See, e.g., SEC v. i2 Technologies, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18741, Civil Action No.
3:04 CV 1250, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1187 (June 9, 2004); In re Axeda Systems Inc., Release No.
48783, Administrative Proceeding No. 3-11334, 2003 SEC LEXIS 2710 (Nov. 14, 2003); In re
Critical Path, Inc., Securities Litigation, 156 F. Supp. 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
5See, e.g., In re Homestore.com, Inc. Securities Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 2d 769 (C.D. Cal.
2004); SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18760, Case No. CV-0404-4506 RGk, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1289 (June 23, 2004).
6See, e.g., SEC v. Symbol Technologies, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18734, Case No. CV
04 2276, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1120 (June 3, 2004).
7Ira M. Millstein, The Heat Is Still On: DirectorLiability Warnings from Delaware, DiRECTOR'S MONTHLY (January 14, 2003), available at http://www.nacdonline.orgdm/NACDJan-14-2003-DMX.pdf.
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tors" will play a role in a court's assessment of what information was
"reasonably available" and whether the directors have "acted in good
faith."
Sarbanes-Oxley and SRO rules have not eroded the "business
judgment rule." The bottom line is if directors act reasonably and in
good faith, they will be protected from liability. From the perspective
of SEC actions, let me be very clear, participating in, overlooking, or
ignoring red flags indicating possible fraudulent accounting is not a
business decision. As the SEC action against Candies directors illustrates, the situations where directors have to be worried about an SEC
action against them is where they act very unreasonably and in bad
faith. Where you see SEC actions against directors is where information regarding possible improper accounting practices or indicia of
possible improper recognition of revenue comes to the attention of a
director and a reasonable director, acting in good faith, would investigate. If the directors do not conduct an independent investigation,
they are not acting reasonably or in good faith and should not be protected by the "business judgment rule." It is that simple and it is not a
different analysis after Sarbanes-Oxley.
The Director'sMonthly article raises two questions that are worth
focusing on because they highlight that directors need to be involved
in order to act in good faith. First, the article asks: can directors have
a good faith belief that an audit committee of a multi-billion dollar
multi-national corporation that meets for an hour quarterly (with some
participating by phone) devoted enough time and attention to oversight? No! Not even close! Second, should the audit committee and
board have their own independent advisors, investigators, and lawyers? Yes. As guided by Sarbanes-Oxley, the board and its committees should "engage independent counsel and other advisors, as it
determines necessary to carry out its duties" and should not rely exclusively on the corporation's advisors and lawyers.
As a final point, directors who are supposed to be independent
should have the guts to be a pain in the neck and act independently.
H. DirectorIndependence Under State Law
While this is certainly not an area that is directly within the Commission's jurisdiction, I wanted to briefly mention director independence in the context of state law and discuss a case that I personally
believe is an important one.
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8
1. In re Oracle Corp Derivative Litigation

In In re Oracle, a shareholder derivative suit was filed against
Larry Ellison, CEO of Oracle, and several directors accusing them of
breaching their fiduciary duties by engaging in insider trading. After
the filing of the complaint, Oracle established a special litigation
committee ("SLC") composed of two "independent" directors to
evaluate the insider trading claim, which ultimately concluded that
the CEO and directors did not have material nonpublic information
and that Oracle should thus not pursue the insider trading claim. The
SLC moved for termination of the derivative action. The SLC had the
burden of persuading the court that: (1) the members of the SLC were
independent; (2) the SLC members acted in good faith; and (3) the
SLC had reasonable bases for the recommendations.
The Delaware chancery court denied the SLC's motion on the basis that the SLC had failed to show that no material factual question
existed as to the independence of the SLC. Specifically, the existence
of Stanford University connections among the SLC members (both
were Stanford professors), as well as the fact that the CEO had considered giving $170 million to Stanford, led the court to indicate that
there was "a social atmosphere painted in too much vivid Stanford
Cardinal red for the SLC members to have reasonably ignored it." 9
Vice-Chancellor Strine concluded that the SLC has not met its burden
to show the absence of a material factual question about its independence due to the "substantial" relationships among the SLC, the Trading Defendants, and Stanford. These ties were so significant that they
caused reasonable doubt about the SLC's ability to impartially consider whether the Trading Defendants should face the lawsuit.
In describing the independence of the SLC, Vice-Chancellor Strine
indicated that he was measuring independence "contextually" and that
this
contextual approach is a strength of [Delaware] law, as even the
best minds have yet to devise across-the-board definitions that
capture all the circumstances in which the independence of directors might reasonably be questioned. By taking into account
all circumstances, the Delaware approach undoubtedly results in
some level of indeterminacy, but with the compensating benefit
that independence determinations are tailored to the precise
situation at issue.' 0
In re Oracle Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 917 (Del Ch. 2003).
9 Id. at 947.
8

10 Id. at 941.
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Vice-Chancellor Strine noted the recent reforms through Congressional action and the SROs. In this regard, Strine indicated that these
actions were narrower in scope as to who constituted "independent
directors" but that there was recognition by, for example, the New
York Stock Exchange listing standards that it was not possible to capture all circumstances involving potential conflicts of interest or that
might relate to the materiality of a director's relationship with a listed
company.
In thinking about director independence, in my opinion, it is important not to look only at the specific requirements that exist (for
example, through the NYSE and NASDAQ listing standards) but also
to carefully consider any sort of relationships that could be deemed to
impair independence. From a regulatory perspective, it is not possible to implement standards that capture every possible situation, primarily because independence determinations relate to a fact-specific
inquiry. In my view, I believe that this case sends an important message that boards must carefully consider all factors that could lead to
possible non-independence.
L New Nominating Committee DisclosureRequirements
As part of the Commission's ongoing examination of the director
nomination area, the Commission adopted new disclosure rules relating to enhanced disclosure of the director nomination process. Companies must now disclose, among other things, the minimum qualifications and standards that they seek in director candidates and
whether the nominating committee will consider director candidates
submitted by shareholders, and if so, the process for consideration of
such candidates. With respect to suggestions of director candidates
by greater than five percent shareholders who have held their shares
for at least one year, the company must disclose whether it has rejected such director candidates and, if both have consented, the identities of the five percent shareholder and its director candidate.
While not a part of the NYSE and NASDAQ listing standards, I
believe that this disclosure requirement will provide for more meaningful information relating to nominating committees and the director
nomination process generally. Investors, including significant institutional investors, have indicated that this type of transparency is important to them.
J. ShareholderAccess
Because others will be commenting extensively on shareholder access, I will just briefly give you my views. In regard to shareholder
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nominations of directors, many have advocated for independent
nominating committees, full disclosure of nominating committee procedures, and consideration of shareholder-named candidates, over
mandatednominations based on numerical "triggering events."
I want to be frank about where I come down on this. We pored
over literally thousands of comment letters, and our proposal, requiring two triggering events, is out there now. We will set a date for
finalizing the rule, I hope before the end of the year, if not sooner. I
am on the record in favor of the proposal, and I believe that the facts
clearly support me on this. The proposal is very modest. Shareholders will never be permitted to seek a majority of the board; as proposed, they will only be allowed to nominate one candidate out of a
board of eight directors, two for boards with between nine and nineteen directors, and at most, three for boards with twenty or more directors. And-and it's a big "and"-the nominee has to be independent of the shareholders, so they cannot put their own person on there.
I don't see the threat to the day-to-day business that many in the corporate community have indicated to us. If there are facts that I am not
taking into account, then I certainly want to understand them, because
I do not want to create a business obstruction. But I just don't see it.
So far all I have heard is supposition. In fact, all the evidence that I
see points to the contrary.
In many other developed countries, shareholders have much
greater access to the proxy. In fact, in Canada, if you have five percent of votes, you can put forward a whole slate of directors. But
even under that regime, the rule is almost never used.
I believe if we do not adopt this moderate proposal, the shareholder activists will come roaring back with a vengeance and will
want much more access and create a much more onerous situation for
business. I don't think that's necessary. The proposal allows for negotiation and it gives companies time to react. I don't believe it gives
shareholders undue influence. Remember that all of the shareholders
have a vote and no overly narrow interest will carry the day. Under
the proposal, a narrow interest group will never be able to persuade
fifty percent of the shareholders to support an item that hurts shareholder value. Ultimately, such groups will not gain leverage in discussion with the company unless there is a potential for success.
K. Business Ethics
We all know that having rules in life is not enough. Indeed, if it
were enough, the existence of the laws and rules would ensure proper
conduct among human beings. For this reason, I urge all of you-the
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current and future board members, and corporate executives, and
counselors for public companies-to live and practice on a daily basis
good ethics and principles.
My colleagues and I at the SEC have encouraged corporate directors and senior management to make it clear to employees through
their words and conduct that ethics matter. Senior management and
boards of directors should establish practices that acknowledge and
commend acts of honesty and ethical behavior.
Just as good deeds in life create unforeseen blessings, I believe it is
fundamental that honesty and integrity will ultimately create business
success. Creating an ethical business culture should not be viewed as
a sacrifice. Indeed, it is good business to be open and honest with
your shareholders. It is good business to have fair dealings with your
business partners. It is good business to reward employees for being
honest and ethical. It is good business to be known as a company that
deals fairly in its business transactions. It is good business for shareholders to know that a company not only has a code of ethics but that
the code is followed every day. It is also good business to select leaders largely based on their integrity and commitment to ethical behavior.
In conclusion, I believe that we have come a long way in implementing some long-needed reforms. Independence of directors,
stricter guidelines with respect to independent auditors and audit
committees, and other regulations, while not a panacea, will, in my
opinion, result in companies being held more accountable. It is my
hope that the great concern that we have seen today by companies,
their management and their boards will continue in the future, through
the next bull market and beyond.

